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CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
II. ARREST TO INDICTMENT
by
Ronald L. Goranson*
Confessions, Bail, Extradition, Grand Jury and Counsel
A. Confessions
Interrogation-Right to Counsel. During this survey year the Supreme
Court announced two decisions concerning the self-incrimination and right
to counsel clauses of the United States Constitution. In the first, Oregon v.
Mathiason,'9 the Court provided a much narrower definition of "custodial
interrogation"' 95 than delineated in its opinions of the previous decade.'9
The decision, however, is a continuation of a trend of the current Court
recognized in last year's Survey toward defining custody literally. 197 In
summarily reversing a judgment by the Oregon Supreme Court, 198 the Court
in Mathiason held that a police officer who invited a parolee suspected of
burglary to the police station was not required to give the suspect Miranda '99
warnings before questioning him about the crime. The per curiam opinion
held that the interrogation was not custodial, stating:
police officers are not required to administer Miranda warnings to
everyone whom they question. Nor is the requirement of warnings to be
imposed simply because the questioning takes place in the stationhouse,
or because the questioned person is one whom the police suspect. 2°°
Miranda warnings are required only where there has been such a restric-
tion on a person's freedom as to render him "in custody." It was that
sort of coercive environment to which Miranda by its terms was made
applicable, and to which it is limited.2"'
* B.S.B.A., University of Arkansas; J.D., Southern Methodist University. Attorney at
Law, Dallas, Texas.
194. 97 S. Ct. 711, 50 L. Ed. 2d 714 (1977).
195. In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), the Court stated: "By custodial interroga-
tion, we mean questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken
into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." Id. at 444.
By footnote to the above sentence the opinion stated: "This is what we meant in Escobedo
[Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964)] when we spoke of an investigation which had
focused on an accused." 384 U.S. at 444 n.4.
196. See Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324 (1969) (interrogation occurred in the suspect's house
after he had been arrested and was not free to leave); Mathias v. United States, 391 U.S. 1
(1968) (Court refused to follow government's contention that Miranda was applicable only to
one who was "in custody" in connection with the very case under investigation).
197. Perini, Criminal Law and Procedure, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 31 Sw. L.J. 393,
401-02 (1977).
198. State v. Mathiason, 275 Ore. 1, 549 P.2d 673 (1976).
199. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
200. In Creeks v. State, 542 S.W.2d 849 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976), a case discussed in last
year's survey, Perini, supra note 197, at 402, a probationer was held to be entitled to Miranda
warnings where he was at the probation office voluntarily and was suspected by the police. In
that case, however, an arrest warrant had already been issued for the probationer and the
probation officer had already summoned the police to arrest him when the inculpatory state-
ments were made.
201. 97S. Ct. at 714,50 L. Ed. 2d at 719.
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The Court also held that a false statement made by the interrogator to the
accused that his fingerprints were found at the scene of the crime was
irrelevant to the custody issue. 20
2
The second case was the much publicized opinion of Brewer v. Williams20 3
in which an officer's ruse2° 4 led to the reversal of a murder conviction. The
accused had surrendered pursuant to arrangements made by his attorneys,
both of whom advised him not to talk to the police. 205 After arraignment, as
the accused was transferred from one city to another, the officer persuaded
the accused to take him to the place where the body was located. 2° The
Supreme Court, in a five-to-four decision, held that the interrogation of the
accused without a showing of a waiver of his right to counsel was improper.
In delivering the opinion, Justice Stewart recognized that the facts presented
in the instant case were constitutionally indistinguishable from those of
Massiah v. United States207 and stated:
the clear rule of Massiah is that once adversary proceedings have
commenced against an individual, he has a right to legal representation
when the government interrogates him. It thus requires no wooden or
technical application of the Massiah doctrine to conclude that Williams
was entitled to the assistance of counsel guaranteed him by the Sixth
and Fourteenth Amendments.
Despite Williams' express and implied assertions of his right to
counsel, [the officer] proceeded to elicit incriminating statements from
Williams. [The officer] did not preface this effort by telling Williams
that he had a right to the presence of a lawyer, and made no effort at all
to ascertain whether Williams wished to relinquish that right.2"
Chief Justice Burger dissented, contending that the exclusionary rule should
not be applied to non-egregious police conduct. 219
One of the issues in Brewer was whether or not the officer's "Christian
burial speech" was a form of interrogation. Mr. Justice Stewart's opinion
held that, because the speech was a deliberate and designed effort to elicit
information, it was legally equivalent to formal interrogation. 10 Applying
that holding, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
reversed the conviction in United States v. Jordan .2 I' The arresting officer
in Jordan knew the accused was operating a motor vehicle without a proper
license. He had also received information, sufficient to establish probable
cause, that the accused possessed a sawed-off shotgun. Upon stopping the
accused for the traffic violation, the officer told the accused about the
202. Id.
203. 97 S. Ct. 1232, 51 L. Ed. 2d 424 (1977).
204. The officer knew that the accused was a deeply religious former mental patient. The
officer gave what was termed the "Christian burial speech," urging the accused to locate the
body of the deceased before an approaching storm caused several inches of snow to fall. Id. at
1236, 51 L. Ed. 2d at 432-33.
205. Id. at 1235, 51 L. Ed. 2d at 431.
206. Id. at 1236, 51 L. Ed. 2d at 433.
207. 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
208. 97 S. Ct. at 1240-41, 1243, 51 L. Ed. 2d at 438, 440-41.
209. Id. at 1250-54, 51 L. Ed. 2d at 450-56. Justices Blackmun, White and Rehnquist also
dissented but did not join the Chief Justice.
210. Id. at 1239-40, 51 L. Ed. 2d at 436-37.
211. 557 F.2d 1081 (5th Cir. 1977).
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information concerning the shotgun that he had received.2 12 Because of the
accused's reaction to this statement, the officer searched the automobile,
finding the shotgun under the front seat. Citing Brewer the Fifth Circuit held
that the officer's statement to the accused was the equivalent of interroga-
tion213 and therefore the Miranda warnings should have been given before
advising the accused of the information concerning the shotgun. 214
Prior to the decision in Brewer the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
delineated the standard for waiver of counsel who has already been retained
in McKittrick v. State.2 5 The court held that the accused had made a lawful
waiver of counsel before signing a confession, even though she had retained
counsel before doing so. The opinion stated:
This court, however, has never interpreted Miranda to mean that once
counsel has been requested or obtained, the same forever bars law
enforcement officers from interrogating an accused provided the prose-
cution sustains its heavy burden of showing an affirmative waiver. And
this is particularly true where the accused initiates the conversation
with the officers.2 16
The court found that McKittrick was a twenty-three year old woman who
had a prior criminal record and some experience with law enforcement
officers. 217 She had also been warned by a magistrate prior to making the
confession, the written confession had the standard "boiler plate" Miranda
recitations, and the totality of the circumstances indicated a knowing and
intelligent waiver of counsel. 218
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals also refused to extend present law
to require the appointment of counsel in a "serious" case before a con-
fession could be obtained. In Woodkins v. State,219 a capital murder case,
the court held that, absent a request, the failure of the magistrate to sua
sponte appoint counsel would not void the subsequently obtained con-
fession. 2 0
Coerced Confessions. In Smith v. State221 the accused testified that his
confession to FBI agents -was the product of physical coercion by New
Orleans police officers. 2 2 The FBI agents stated that they did not coerce the
accused but could not say what the New Orleans officers did. 223 No New
Orleans officers testified. The court of criminal appeals stated "it has long
been the law of this State that whenever the testimony of the accused as to
212. Id. at 1082.
213. Judge Simpson's opinion stated: "Certainly the police may not circumvent a constitu-
tional requirement by using the 'technique' of posing a question in a declaratory fashion." Id.
at 1085 (footnote omitted).
214. Id. at 1085-86.
215. 541 S.W.2d 177 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976).
216. Id. at 183 (citations omitted).
217. Id.
218. Id. at 184.
219. 542 S.W.2d 855 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).
220. Id. at 858.
221. 547 S.W.2d 6 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).
222. Id. at 7-8.
223. Id. at 8.
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the alleged coercive acts is undisputed, then as a matter of law the con-
fession is inadmissible. 224
Oral Confessions-Legislation. During this survey year the Texas Legisla-
ture completely redrafted articles 38.21 and 38.22 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, the confession statutes,225 but made only one major change.
Article 38.22 was changed to permit the admission of an oral statement
against the accused "for the purpose of impeachment only, 226 when: (1) the
statement is visually recorded; (2) the accused is advised that the recording
is being made; (3) the accused is properly warned pursuant to statute and
lawfully waives his rights; (4) the recording device operates correctly, the
operator is competent, and the recording is accurate and is not altered; (5)
the statement is witnessed by at least two persons; and (6) all the voices on
the recording are identified. 227 As amended, the statute substantially mod-
ifies Butler v. State228 which reiterated the long standing rule that an oral
statement not admissible as original evidence was also inadmissible for
impeachment purposes. 229
The visual recording provision, however, is not applicable to any state-
ment which contains assertions of facts or circumstances that are found to
be true and which tend to establish the guilt of the accused.230 Thus, state-
ments leading to the fruits of the offense or the instrument used to commit
the offense are still admissible. 231 As a corollary, a harsh penalty is provided
for any person who testifies falsely to facts which, if true, would render the
statement admissible. 232
The amended statute also provides that it does not preclude the use "of a
voluntary statement, whether or not the result of custodial interrogation,
that has a bearing upon the credibility of the accused as a witness .... 233
Whether this provision is intended to permit the use of statements not taken
in compliance with Miranda or to permit in limited circumstances the use of
oral statements not taken in compliance with the statute must be left to
judicial interpretation. Significantly, the legislature specifically provided
that the amended statute applies only to confessions taken on or after
August 29, 1977.234
224. Id. (quoting Farr v. State, 519 S.W.2d 876, 880 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975)).
225. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. arts. 38.21, .22 (Vernon Supp. 1978).
226. Id. art. 38.22, § 3(a).
227. Id. § 3(a)(l)-(6).
228. 493 S.W.2d 190 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973).
229. The court refused to hold that the opinion in Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971)
compelled an abandonment of the long established precedent. Harris held that a failure to
comply with Miranda would not prohibit the use of a confession for impeachment purposes.
230. TEx. CODE CRIM. PRoc. ANN. art. 38.22, § 3(c) (Vernon Supp. 1978).
231. For an example of the circumstances in which such a statement is admissible, see Chase
v. State, 508 S.W.2d 605 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974).
232. The statute provides a presumption that the person "acted with intent to deceive and
with knowledge of the statement's meaning for the purpose of prosecution for aggravated
perjury under Section 37.03 of the Penal Code" and prohibits probation if a conviction results.
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.22, § 4 (Vernon Supp. 1978).
233. Id. § 5.
234. Id. § 3.
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Oral Confessions-Cases. In Presswood v. State235 and Newberry v.
State236 convictions were reversed because the answers of the accused to
preliminary questions asked shortly after arrest had been admitted. The
officer in Presswood found a small amount of marijuana in a car and asked
"Whose is it?"2 37 In Newberry the officer asked the accused the number of
drinks he had consumed and the places where he had been.238 In both cases
the investigation had begun to focus on the accused, the accused had been
placed in restraint, no Miranda warnings had been given, and the answers
were clearly inculpatory.239
In Dudley v. State240 a three-judge majority241 held that it was improper for
the State to elicit testimony before the jury, over objection, that the accused
had been offered a breathalyzer test but had refused to take it. 242 Judge
Phillips, writing the majority opinion, based his decision on the reasoning in
Doyle v. Ohio ,243 the requirements on article 38.22 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, and the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the Constitution. 21
Judge Douglas concurred, relying solely on Doyle.245 Presiding Judge On-
ion's lengthy concurring opinion was based not only upon article 38.22 and
the decision in Doyle, but also upon the fact that the accused has the
statutory right 246 to refuse to take the test, and the fact that the probative
value of the evidence was too small to offset the prejudicial effect. 247
Although he did not reach the constitutional grounds, the judge noted that
courts in three other jurisdictions have held that such evidence of refusal
constitutes compulsory self-incrimination.2 4
Jackson v. Denno Hearing.249  In Roberts v. State2 50 the accused argued
that once he objected to the voluntariness of a confession at trial the State
235. 548 S.W.2d 398 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).
236. 552 S.W.2d 457 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).
237. 548 S.W.2d at 399.
238. 552 S.W.2d at 458-60.
239. 548 S.W.2d at 399; 552 S.W.2d at 461.
240. 548 S.W.2d 706 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).
241. Judges Roberts and Odum dissented.
242. See also Hitt v. State, 548 S.W.2d 732 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977); Boney v. State, 548
S.W.2d 730 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977); Sutton v. State, 548 S.W.2d 720 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977);
Martinez v. State, 548 S.W.2d 719 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977); Clinard v. State, 548 S.W.2d 716
(Tex. Crim. App. 1977).
243. 426 U.S. 610 (1976). In that case the Court held that the fact of the accused's silence at
the time of arrest and his decision to invoke his fifth amendment right to remain silent could not
be used at his trial for impeachment purposes.
244. Judge Phillips stated: "Though not expressly stated heretofore, the decisions constru-
ing art. 38.22 . . .reveal that, in practical application, said statute has been held to prohibit any
act, silence or oral statement of an accused while in custody which has communicative or
testimonial characteristics, substantially the same as the Fifth Amendment." 548 S.W.2d at
708.
245. Id. at 715.
246. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 67011-5 (Vernon 1977).
247. 548 S.W.2d at 709, 711, 712, 714.
248. Id. at 714-15 (citing Gay v. City of Orlando, 202 So.2d 896 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967);
Johnson v. State, 125 Ga. App. 607, 188 S.E.2d 416 (1972); State v. Andrews, 297 Minn. 260,
212 N.W.2d 863 (1973)).
249. Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964) requires a hearing outside the presence of thejury to determine the admissibility of a confession. See also TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. ait.
38.22(b) (Vernon Supp. 1978). The 1977 amendments to art. 38.22 did not change the procedure.
See notes 225-27 supra and accompanying text.
250. 545 S.W.2d 157 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).
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had to show that the arrest was lawful, even though this issue was decided at
a pre-trial hearing. The court held that since a defendant, to preserve error
on appeal, need not renew during trial an objection made at a pre-trial
hearing on a motion to suppress,25 ' the corollary rule is that the State may
rely upon the evidence showing probable cause heard during the motion to
suppress and need not again offer the evidence at trial.
252
Two cases discussed aspects of cross-examination at the Jackson v.
Denno hearing. Masters v. State253 held that the accused was entitled to
testify solely on the issue of voluntariness of the confession without subject-
ing himself to unlimited cross-examination on other issues at a hearing on a
motion to revoke probation. Myre v. State254 held that the accused was
entitled to the statements of a witness who testified at the Jackson v. Denno
hearing, even though the statement had not been used by the witness during
trial to refresh his memory. 255 This opinion clearly indicates that the Gas-
kin 256 rule is applicable in all situations in which a prosecution witness
testifies.
False Statements. In Leary v. United States 57 the celebrated Dr. Timothy
Leary2 58 was unable to convince the Fifth Circuit that his false declarations
at a United States customs inspection station were tainted by a violation of
his right against compulsory self-incrimination. The court held that the self-
incrimination privilege does not protect a person making a false response to
a required declaration.25 9
Juvenile Proceedings. On appeal from the retrial of Ridyolph v. State"6° the
appellant contended that the admissibility of his pre-Family Code2 61 con-
fession should have been governed by the limitations on obtaining a con-
fession stated in the Family Code.2 62 The court, however, held that the
admissibility of the confession was governed by the law in effect at the time
the confession was given.
2 63
251. Id. at 158 (citing Riojas v. State, 530 S.W.2d 298 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975), and Graves v.
State, 513 S.W.2d 57 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974)).
252. 545 S.W.2d at 158.
253. 545 S.W.2d 180 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).
254. 545 S.W.2d 820 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).
255. The conviction was not reversed in Myre because the statement was given to counsel
later during the trial and he could have recalled the witness. Id. at 823.
256. Gaskin v. State, 172 Tex. Crim. 7, 353 S.W.2d 467 (1962) (pretrial statements given by
prosecution witness who testifies at trial must be given to defense counsel).
257. 544 F.2d 1266 (5th Cir. 1977).
258. Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6 (1969); Leary v. United States, 383 F.2d 851 (5th
Cir. 1967).
259. See note 295 infra and accompanying text for a comparison with false statements
before the grand jury.
260. 545 S.W.2d 784 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977). A previous conviction was reversed in
Ridyolph v. State, 503 S.W.2d 276 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973) for the suppression of evidence.
261. The Family Code was effective September 1, 1973.
262. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 51.09 (Vernon 1975). Prior to amendment on September 1,
1975, that section provided that an accused must have counsel at the time of the confession. See
Lovell v. State, 525 S.W.2d 511 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975). The 1975 amendment permits admis-
sion of a confession without counsel under certain limited circumstances. TEX. FAM. CODE
ANN. § 51.09(b) (Vernon Supp. 1978).
263. 545 S.W.2d at 786. "Prior to the enactment of the Family Code, a minor could waive his
right to counsel before making an extrajudicial statement." Id. at 787.
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Civil Contempt. In Ex parte Stringer2" the husband had been incarcerated
for failure to make payments to his former wife pursuant to a divorce
decree. The court held that once counsel asserted relator's privilege against
compulsory self-incrimination, the husband should not have been sworn and
compelled to answer questions. The court stated, "[i]t has long been the law
in this State that witnesses in a purely civil proceeding may claim their
constitutional privilege against self-incrimination. "265
Plea Negotiations. In Hutto v. Ross 266 the Supreme Court considered the
admissibility of a confession made subsequent to an agreed-upon plea bar-
gain which did not require the confession when the defendant later withdrew
from the plea bargain and demanded a jury trial. Holding the confession
admissible, the per curiam opinion concluded that since the defendant could
have enforced the plea agreement whether or not he gave the confession, the
confession was not the result of any promises or coercion on the part of the
prosecution and hence was not involuntary. 67
B. Bail
Amount. In several opinions the court of criminal appeals stated the
principle that, while bail should be sufficiently high to give reasonable
assurance that the accused will comply with the undertaking, the power to
require bail is not to be used so as to make it an instrument of oppression.2"
Legislation. Article I la of the Texas Constitution was amended at the
November 8, 1977, election to give the district court discretion to deny bail
to a person who (1) has been indicted for a felony while on bail for another
felony or (2) has been accused of a felony less than capital involving the use
of a deadly weapon after being convicted of a felony.2 69 The amendment
further provides that the order denying bail will be automatically set aside if
the accused is not accorded a trial within sixty days, provided the accused
does not obtain a continuance.
264. 546 S.W.2d 837 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [ist Dist.] 1977, no writ).
265. Id. at 840 (citing Dendy v. Wilson, 142 Tex. 460, 179 S.W.2d 269 (1944)). The opinion
also cited Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 444 (1972), in which it was stated that theprivilege "can be asserted in any proceeding, civil or criminal, administrative or judicial,
investigatory or adjudicatory ....
266. 97 S. Ct. 202, 50 L. Ed. 2d 194.
267. Id. at 203-04, 50 L. Ed. 2d 196-98. But see United States v. Albano, 414 F. Supp. 67(S.D.N.Y. 1976), in which a possibly incriminating letter written incidental to the plea by the
defendant to the court was not admissible at trial after the plea negotiations failed. See generally
FED. R. CRIM. P. 11. See also Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 495 (1971) which left open the
question of whether or not a plea agreement could be enforced.
268. Ex parte Branch, 553 S.W.2d 380 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977) ($500,000 bail set for charged
offense of heroin possession held excessive and reduced to $20,000); Ex parte Bufkin, 553
S.W.2d 116 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977) ($150,000 bail set for charged offense of conspiracy to
commit capital murder held excessive). See also TEX. CODE CRIM. PRoc. ANN. art. 17.15(Vernon 1965).
269. TEX. CONST. art. 1, § I la(2), (3). TEX. CONST. art. I, § II denies bail where thedefendant is charged with a capital offense and the proof is evident that the accused will
probably be convicted and receive the death penalty. TEX. CONST. art. I, § I la(l), adopted Nov.
6, 1956, also denies bail to a person accused of a felony less than capital who has twice before
been convicted of a felony.
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Appeal Bond. The Texas Legislature also amended article 44.04 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure. 270 Denial of bail to persons whose punishment
exceeds fifteen years is retained. 271 In addition, however, the trial court may
now deny bail if there exists good cause to believe that the defendant would
not appear when the conviction became final or that the defendant is likely
to commit another offense while on bail. 272 The amendment permits the
court to impose reasonable conditions on the bail and, upon a finding on a
preponderance of the evidence that the condition has been violated, to
revoke the bail. 273 In Ex parte August 274 the court stated that if a petitioner
files a writ of habeas corpus contending the appeal bond is excessive, the
trial court must have a hearing on that issue. The new amendment to article
44.04 provides an appeal as of right for review of any order setting bail
pursuant to the statute. 275
Setting Bail-Misdemeanor Case. Hokr v. State276 held that a peace offic-
er may take bail in a misdemeanor case before the accused is charged. The
decision also held that the peace officer could set the amount of bail if no
magistrate was available. 277
Surrender by Surety. The surety in McConathy v. State278 filed an affidavit
to surrender his principal, but the trial court refused to issue a warrant. The
court of criminal appeals held that the trial court could not refuse to issue a
warrant for the principal when requested by the surety pursuant to article
17.19 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 279
Extradition. In Ex parte Quinn210 the court of criminal appeals overruled a
1976 Attorney General's opinion281 and held that a petitioner/appellant is
entitled to bail pending appeal of a habeas corpus judgment, notwithstanding
the issuance of a governor's warrant. 28 2
C. Extradition
Right to Counsel. Article 51.13, section 25a of the Code of Criminal
Procedure 28 3 sets forth the procedure by which a person arrested in Texas
270. TEX. CODE CRIM. PRoc. ANN. art. 44.04 (Vernon Supp. 1978).
271. Id. art. 44.04(b).
272. Id. art. 44.04(c).
273. Id.
274. 552 S.W.2d 169 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).
275. TEX. CODE CRIM. PRoc. ANN. art. 44.04(g) (Vernon Supp. 1978).
276. 545 S.W.2d 463, 464 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).
277. Id. at 465. These changes in procedure were permitted by the 1971 amendments to arts.
17.05 and 17.20, thus reversing the decision in Mayberry v. State, 168 Tex. Crim. 537, 330
S.W.2d 203 (1959).
278. 545 S.W.2d 166 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).
279. Id. at 168-69.
280. 549 S.W.2d 198 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).
281. TEX. Arr'Y GEN. Op. No. H-803 (1976). That opinion concluded that a person held for
extradition may not be admitted to bail after issuance of the governor's warrant pending
determination of an appeal from a remand to custody.
282. The court's opinion was based upon the fact that TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art.
44.35 (Vernon 1965) permits bail on the appeal of any habeas corpus judgment, and art. 51.13, §
16 permits bail in extradition cases except capital cases where the proof is evident.
283. 549 S.W.2d at 199-200. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 51.13, § 25(a) (Vernon 1965).
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but charged in another state can waive extradition proceedings and consent
to return to the demanding state. The statute provides that the waiver must
be executed in writing before a judge or any court of record. In Ex parte
Medieros284 the fugitive argued that his waiver was ineffective because he
did not receive the advice of counsel prior to the waiver. Rejecting this
contention, the court of criminal appeals held that the record conclusively
demonstrated that the trial court adhered to the requirements of article
51.13285 and informed the fugitive of his statutory rights. 286 Since it was the
judge and not counsel who was to advise the individual of his rights, the fact
that the fugitive was not advised by counsel was not a controlling issue. 287
Pleadings. In Ex parte Flores288 the Alabama affidavits upon which the
requests for a governor's warrant was based failed to state the date of the
offense. Applying former cases concerning the failure of an indictment from
a demanding state to contain the date of the offense, 289 the Texas court held
that the matter of the sufficiency of the criminal pleadings in the demanding
state is no concern of the asylum state. 29
D. Grand Jury
Self-incrimination Privilege. In two cases decided during this survey year
the'Supreme Court narrowed the protections afforded a witness before a
grand jury. In United States v. Washington291 the defendant contended that
his testimony before the grand jury should have been suppressed because he
had not been advised in advance of his testimony that he was a putative
defendant. The Court held that since the target witness status neither
enlarged nor diminished the constitutional protection against compulsory
self-incrimination "potential defendant warnings add nothing of value" to
those rights. 292 The Court stated that the true test was whether or not the
witness had been compelled to give self-incriminating testimony. 293 Finding
no compulsion, the Court rejected the defendant's claim of compelled self-
incrimination. 294
284. 552 S.W.2d 156, 157 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).
285. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 51.13 (Vernon 1965) is the Texas version of the
Uniform Extradition Act. Section 10 of the Act provides that no person arrested pursuant to a
governor's warrant shall be delivered to the demanding state until first taken before a judge of a
court of record. The judge must inform him of the demand, the nature of the offense against
him, and his right to demand or procure counsel.
286. Nothing in the reported opinion in Medieros indicates whether the fugitive was advised
of his right to counsel. 552 S.W.2d 156-58.
287. No mention was made as to whether the hearing before the magistrate was a critical
stage of the proceedings, see Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970); whether the right to
counsel was dependent upon a request for counsel, see Swenson v. Bosler, 386 U.S. 258 (1967);
or whether the fugitive voluntarily, intelligently and understandingly waived counsel, see
Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972).
288. 548 S.W.2d 31 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).
289. Ex parte Woodland, 146 Tex. Crim. 616, 177 S.W.2d 62 (1943); Pearce v. State, 32 Tex.
Crim. 301, 23 S.W. 15 (1893), aff'd sub nom. Pearce v. Texas, 155 U.S. 311 (1894).
290. 548 S.W.2d at 33.
291. 97 S. Ct. 1814, 52 L. Ed. 2d 238 (1977).
292. Id. at 1820, 52 L. Ed. 2d at 246.
293. Id. at 1819, 52 L. Ed. 2d at 245.
294. In United States v. Doe, 541 F.2d 490 (5th Cir. 1976) the court held that the fact that a




The defendant in United States v. Wong 295 was indicted for perjury before
the grand jury. She claimed that the testimony should have been suppressed
because, due to her limited command of the English language, she had not
comprehended the prosecutor's explanation of the fifth amendment
privilege and thought she was required to answer all the questions.296 Fol-
lowing United States v. Mandujano,297 the Court held that the fifth amend-
ment privilege does not condone perjury.298 Thus, even if the witness was
not effectively informed as to the nature of the privilege, "perjury [was] not
a permissible way of objecting to the Government's questions. 299
In this survey year the Fifth Circuit reaffirmed the power of the grand
jury to compel witnesses to submit to the taking of voice exemplars,3°°
fingerprints, palm prints, and photographs.30' To quash the subpoena the
witness must assert that the grand jury has lost the independence which is
essential to the historical assumption of neutrality that underlies the grand
jury process.302
Composition. The defendant in Bouchillon v. State30 3 sought to quash the
indictment due to the disqualification of two of the grand jurors returning
the indictment because the "anti-nepotism" statute 301 rendered the grand
jurors morally unfit under article 19.08 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 30 5
In that case a grand jury commissioner had appointed her daughter-in-law
and her husband's niece as grand jurors. The court of criminal appeals first
held that the challenge to the array was untimely. 3°6 Further, the court found
no merit in the defendant's contention, 30 7 apparently holding that grand jury
commissioners are not State officers within the scope of the anti-nepotism
statute.
Procedure. In Owens v. State308 the indictment was signed by another
grand juror whom the foreman had authorized to sign his name.3°9 The court
rejected the objection to the indictment on that ground, stating that since the
295. 97 S. Ct. 1823, 52 L. Ed. 2d 231.
296. Id. at 1825, 52 L. Ed. 2d at 234.
297. 426 U.S. 905 (1975).
298. 97 S. Ct. at 1825, 52 L. Ed. 2d at 235.
299. Id. at 1827, 52 L. Ed. 2d at 237.
300. United States v. Shaw, 555 F.2d 1295 (5th Cir. 1977).
301. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 558 F.2d 1177 (5th Cir. 1977).
302. Id. at 1179 (quoting United States v. Doe, 541 F.2d 490, 492 (5th Cir. 1976)).
303. 540 S.W.2d 319 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976).
304. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5996a (Vernon 1951). The statute provides that no
state, county, or municipal official can appoint any person related to him within the second
degree by affinity and the third degree by consanguinity.
305. TEX. CODE CRIM. PRoc. ANN. art. 19.08 (Vernon 1977).
306. 540 S.W.2d at 323. Article 19.27 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that all
challenges to the array of grand jurors must be made before the grand jury has been impaneled.
See also Connelly v. State, 93 Tex. Crim. 295, 248 S.W. 340 (1923). Judicial interpretation has
expanded the rule to permit a later objection if the accused has never been accorded the chance
to object because he was indicted after impanelment. See e.g., Garret v. State, 66 Tex. Crim.
480, 146 S.W.930 (1912).
307. 540 S.W.2d at 323.
308. 540 S.W.2d 324 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976).
309. The Code of Criminal Procedure provides that the indictment "shall be signed officially
by the foreman of the grand jury." TEX. CODE CRIM. PRoc. ANN. art. 21.02(9) (Vernon 1965).
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failure of the foreman to sign the indictment would not vitiate the instrument
it was permissible for another member of the grand jury to sign the indict-
ment in the foreman's stead.31 0
E. Counsel
Right to Counsel. The Supreme Court's decision in Brewer v. Williams3 1
was based upon the sixth amendment right to counsel clause. Since the
adversary proceedings in Brewer had already begun and there was no
showing that the accused waived his right to counsel before the police began
their interrogation, the Court held that the testimony elicited in the absence
of counsel should have been excluded. 312 The opinion was based upon "the
clear rule of Massiah313 . . . that once adversary proceedings have
commenced against an individual, he has a right to legal representation when
the government interrogates him. "314 As previously noted, the court of
criminal appeals explained the Texas requirements for waiver of the right to
counsel in McKittrick v. State.315
Effectiveness of Retained Counsel. During this survey year the Texas
Court of Criminal Appeals continued to recognize two differing standards
for evaluating the effectiveness of counsel: (1) the "reasonably effective
assistance" standard, generally applied to claims of ineffective appointed
counsel;3 16 and (2) the "breach of legal duty" standard, generally applied to
claims of ineffective retained counsel. 317 In both Ewing v. State31 and
Harrison v. State319 the court held that the retained counsel had not
breached their legal duty320 and affirmed the convictions by a three-judge
majority.3 21 Nevertheless, the dissenting opinions in these cases suggest that
a single standard may evolve in the future. Judge Roberts, dissenting in both
cases, 322 stated that the right to due process should be the same whether
310. 540 S.W.2d at 326.
311. 97 S. Ct. 1232, 51 L. Ed. 2d 4 24 (1977). See notes 203-10 supra and accompanying text.
312. Id. at 1239, 51 L. Ed. 2d at 436-37.
313. Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964). See text accompanying note 207 supra.
314. 97 S. Ct. at 1240-41, 51 L. Ed. 2d 438.
315. 541 S.W.2d 177 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976). See notes 215-18 supra and accompanying
text.
316. See Ex parte Gallegos, 511 S.W.2d 510 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974), in which the court
reaffirmed the "reasonably effective assistance" standard defined in MacKenna v. Ellis, 280
F.2d 592 (5th Cir. 1960), and rejected the "farce and mockery of justice" standard which had
appeared in several cases.
317. See Hunnicutt v. State, 531 S.W.2d 618 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976).
318. 549 S.W.2d 392 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).
319. 552 S.W.2d 151 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).
320. In Harrison the majority opinion held that neither standard was breached. Id. at 152.
321. The difference between the standards is best illustrated in Stutes v. State, 530 S.W.2d
309 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975), in which the court stated:
It is true that where an appointed counsel has an actual conflict of interest a
defendant is denied his right to effective representation without a showing of
specific prejudice. But where counsel is retained, there is no ineffectiveness on
such grounds unless the attorney's representation was fettered or restrained by
his commitments to others, and such commitments were unknown to the defend-
ant.
rd. at 313 (citations omitted).
322. 549 S.W.2d at 396; 552 S.W.2d at 153. Judge Phillips dissented separately in Ewing, 549
S.W.2d at 396, on the grounds that a breach of legal duty had been committed, but concurred in
Judge Roberts' dissent in Harrison, 552 S.W.2d at 153.
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counsel is appointed or retained. 323 That standard, the judge concluded,
should be whether counsel was "reasonably competent." 324
Self-representation. In 1976 the court of criminal appeals held that a trial
court may not force a defendant to accept an attorney if he wishes to waive
representation and defend himself,325 a "correlative" constitutional right
recognized in Faretta v. California.326 The court warned, however, that the
trial court should take care to ascertain that the accused fully understands
the consequences of waiving the right to counsel. 327 In Barbour v. State328
the court held that before permitting an accused the right of self-representa-
tion the record must show a knowing waiver, including an inquiry into
indigency and a warning as to the wisdom or practical consequences of the
choice.3 29
Time to Prepare. Article 26.04 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides
that a court-appointed attorney has a mandatory ten days to prepare for
trial. 330 In Munoz v. State33 ' counsel was appointed to represent the defend-
ant in a sale of narcotics case; the defendant also had an enhanced theft
indictment pending. Over defendant's objection, counsel was forced to go to
trial on the theft case, the trial court noting that it was the local practice to
appoint the same attorney to represent the accused charged with multiple
indictments. 332 The court of criminal appeals reversed because there was
323. The judge reasoned that when the court appoints a lawyer to represent a defendant, he
simply fulfills the constitutional mandate, but does not by this action create a standard of
competency different from that applicable when the individual has the wherewithal to hire the
lawyer. Thus, "[wihile economic status may differ from individual to individual, the right to
due process should remain the same." 549 S.W.2d at 396.
324. 549 S.W.2d at 396 (citing Ex parte Gallegos, 511 S.W.2d 510 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974)).
But see Fitzgerald v. Estelle, 505 F.2d 1334 (5th Cir. 1974), in which the Fifth Circuit held that
only when counsel's ineffectiveness is so blatant as to render the whole trial "fundamentally
unfair" does a violation of fourteenth amendment due process result. While recognizing that
the sixth amendment right to effective assistance of counsel precludes a greater range of
counsel errors than the fourteenth amendment, the court held that "[tihe circumstances in
which the state will be bound by retained counsel's [errors] must be assessed more strictly lest
we place a procedurally intolerable . . . burden on trial judges, who have no control over the
selection of counsel retained by a defendant." Id. at 1336-37 (emphasis added). Thus, the court
required a showing of state involvement in the retained counsel's conduct. Id. at 1337. Three
examples were given: (1) If the trial judge or prosecutor knew that a particular defendant was
receiving incompetent representation and took no remedial action; (2) if they directly partici-
pated in the incompetency; or (3) if the incompetency is so apparent that a reasonably attentive
official of the state should have been aware of and could have corrected it. Id. See Maxon v.
Estelle, 418 F. Supp. 922 (S.D. Tex. 1976), rev'd, 558 F.2d 306 (5th Cir. 1977), for an example of
how Fitzgerald is applied.
325. Webb v. State, 533 S.W.2d 780 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976).
326. 422 U.S. 806 (1975). In Faretta the Court held that an accused in a state criminal trial
has a constitutional right to proceed without counsel when he voluntarily and intelligently elects
to do so.
327. 533 S.W.2d at 785.
328. 551 S.W.2d 371 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).
329. Id. at 372. The opinion concluded that "the record does not reflect that the appellant
was made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, so as to establish that
the appellant knew what he was doing and that his choice was made with his 'eyes open'." Id.
at 373.
330. TEX. CODE CRIM. PRoc. ANN. art. 26.04 (Vernon 1965).
331. 542 S.W.2d 173 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976).
332. Id. at 174.
